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THE ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY
RECORDS: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM A
TECHNOLOGY-CENTERED APPROACH TO
QUANTITATIVE PRIVACY
DAVID GRAY∗
I. Introduction
Long a topic of interest only to Fourth Amendment groupies and would∗ Professor of Law, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. First
and foremost, thanks are due to Professor Stephen Henderson and his colleagues on the
ABA Task Force who were prescient in pressing the initiative that led to these standards and
have committed so much time and good will to their project. Although this essay advances
some concerns about the results, the value of the Standards as they stand and as an ongoing
project cannot be overstated. This essay is itself part of an ongoing project addressing
Fourth Amendment rights and remedies in the twenty-first century. Among its most
important components are: Danielle Keats Citron & David Gray, Addressing the Harm of
Total Surveillance: A Reply to Professor Neil Richards, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 262 (2013);
David Gray, A Spectacular Non Sequitur: The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule Jurisprudence, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2013); David Gray
& Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62 (2013); David
Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls and Potential of the
Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 381 (2013); David
Gray, Danielle Keats Citron, & Liz Clark Rinehart, Fighting Cybercrime After United States
v. Jones, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 745 (2013); and David Gray, Meagan Cooper, &
David McAloon, The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Silver Platter Doctrine, 91 TEX. L.
REV. 7 (2012). For their support and feedback on these efforts, gratitude is due to those who
listened and commented during presentations at Georgetown, Law and Society, Yale, the
Annual Meeting of the ABA/AALS Criminal Law Section, the University of North Carolina,
Northwestern University, the Privacy Law Scholars Conference, the Computers, Freedom,
and Privacy Conference, and during conversations at the American Law Institute Meeting on
Information Privacy Law and Harvard Law Review’s Symposium on Informational Privacy.
Particular thanks go to Ronald Allen, Julia Angwin, Jack Balkin, Kevin Bankston, Steve
Bellovin, Marc Blitz, Richard Boldt, Becky Bolin, Mary Bowman, Al Brophy, Andrew
Chin, Bryan Choi, Thomas Clancy, Julie Cohen, Thomas Crocker, Nick Doty, Lisa Marie
Freitas, Susan Freiwald, Barry Friedman, Brandon Garrett, Bob Gellman, Don Gifford,
Mark Graber, John Grant, James Grimmelmann, Deborah Hellman, Stephen Henderson,
Leslie Meltzer Henry, Lance Hoffman, Renée Hutchins, Camilla Hrdy, Orin Kerr, Joseph
Kennedy, Catherine Kim, Anne Klinefelter, Avner Levin, Michael Mannheimer, Dan
Markel, Christina Mulligan, Richard Myers, Neil Richards, Kathryn Sabbeth, Laurent
Sacharoff, Paul Schwartz, Christopher Slobogin, Robert Smith, Dan Solove, Max Stearns,
David Super, Harry Surden, Peter Swire, Peter Quint, Jason Weinstein, Arthur Weisburd,
and Jonathan Witmer-Rich. Finally, deepest thanks to the W.P. Carey Foundation for its
support of Maryland-Carey School of Law and the scholarly efforts of its faculty.
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be Supreme Court justices,1 the third party doctrine is now a central
concern for citizens of the United States and the world.2 Much of the
impetus for this global awakening is a series of leaked documents proving
what many privacy scholars already suspected or knew3: the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National
Security Administration (NSA), their foreign counterparts,4 and a host of
domestic agents,5 are engaged in programs of expansive and invasive
surveillance that many have credibly compared to the dark prophesies of
George Orwell’s 1984.6 Science fiction, it seems, is now reality.
1. See Michael Dolan, The Bork Tapes, CITY PAPER, Sept. 25, 1987, at 1.
2. See, e.g., Louise Osborne, Europeans Outraged over NSA Spying, Threaten Action,
USA TODAY, Oct. 29, 2013, http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/10/28/reportnsa-spain/3284609/; Alissa Rubin, French Condemn Surveillance by N.S.A., N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 22, 2013, at A4; Craig Timberg, Google Encrypts to Defend Against Spying, WASH.
POST, Sept. 6, 2013, at A1.
3. James Bamford has been leading the reportage charge since well before the recent
revelations. See, e.g., JAMES BAMFORD, THE SHADOW FACTORY: THE ULTRA-SECRET NSA
FROM 9/11 TO THE EAVESDROPPING ON AMERICA (2008) [hereinafter THE SHADOW FACTORY];
James Bamford, The Black Box, WIRED MAG., Apr. 2012, at 78 [hereinafter Bamford, The
Black Box], available at http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/03/ff_nsadatacenter/.
4. Among the most cooperative are parties to the United Kingdom-United States of
America Agreement British, including the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, New
Zealand, and Australia, which are collectively referred to as the “Five Eyes.” See THE
SHADOW FACTORY, supra note 3, at 212-33. The U.K.’s General Communications
Headquarters (GCHQ) has been particularly helpful, playing a key role in efforts by the
NSA to surreptitiously tap data cables and switches located outside the United States in
order to access user information from Google and Yahoo. See id. at 215-18; Charles Arthur,
Google Engineer Accuses NSA and GCHQ of Subverting ‘Judicial Process’, GUARDIAN,
Nov. 6, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/06/google-nsa-gchq-spyingjudicial-process.
5. For example, recently released orders of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
document support provided by telecommunications companies like Verizon and AT&T to the
NSA and FBI’s telephonic surveillance programs. See In re Application of F.B.I. for an Order
Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 13-80, at 4 (Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Ct., Apr. 25, 2013) available at http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/ page/politics/
government-documents-related-to-nsa-collection-of-telephone-metadata-records/351/ (ordering
the disclosure of “all call detail records or ‘telephony metadata’ created by [telephone
companies] for communications (i) between the United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within
the United States, including local telephone calls.”). Other companies gather and aggregate
data for government agencies on a contract basis. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s
Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package
Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595, 595-96 (2004); Natasha
Singer, You for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2012, at BU1.
6. Dan Roberts & Spencer Ackerman, Anger Swells After NSA Phone Records Court
Order Revelations, GUARDIAN, June 6, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
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Among the more disturbing features of this burgeoning surveillance state
is the increasing access that governments have to information about us and
our activities—information that we entrust to third parties such as our
telephone companies, financial institutions, internet service providers,
social networks, and commercial partners. Take, for example, the
revelation that the NSA, in conjunction with the FBI, has been gathering
“all call detail records or ‘telephony metadata’ created by [telephone
companies] for communications (i) between the United States and abroad;
or (ii) wholly within the United States, including local telephone calls.”7
Although these agencies have so far denied gathering either the contents of
telephonic communications8 or the identities of the callers, telephony
metadata, which usually includes telephone numbers, call location, call
duration, and call frequency, “can provide authorities with vast knowledge
about a caller’s identity.”9 “[C]ross-checked against other public records,
the metadata can reveal someone’s name, address, driver’s license, credit
history, social security number and more.”10 A second program, referred to
in leaked documents as “PRISM,” reportedly allows NSA access to
information held on the central servers of nine leading U.S. internet
companies, “extracting audio and video chats, photographs, e-mails,
documents, and connection logs.”11 In addition to, or as part of, this
jun/06/obama-administration-nsa-verizon-records (“From a civil liberties perspective, the
program could hardly be any more alarming. It’s a program in which some untold number
of innocent people have been put under the constant surveillance of government agents. It is
beyond Orwellian, and it provides further evidence of the extent to which basic democratic
rights are being surrendered in secret to the demands of unaccountable intelligence
agencies.” (quoting Jameel Jaffer, Deputy Legal Director of the American Civil Liberties
Union)).
7. In re Application of the F.B.I., No. BR 13-80, at 4.
8. Spencer Ackerman, NSA Goes on 60 Minutes: The Definitive Facts Behind CBS’
Flawed Report, GUARDIAN, Dec. 16, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/dec/16/
nsa-surveillance-60-minutes-cbs-facts. James Bamford has reported that government agencies
are siphoning off content as well. See Bamford, The Black Box, supra note 3, at 84. Recent
revelations of the NSA’s unauthorized infiltration of server networks maintained by Google
and Yahoo as part of the “clouds” in which they store customers’ documents and
communications support Bamford’s reportage. Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA
Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Data Centers Worldwide, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2013, at
A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-toyahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d66 1e-4166-11e38b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html.
9. Roberts & Ackerman, supra note 6.
10. Id.
11. Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S. Mines Internet Firms’ Data, Documents
Show, WASH. POST, June 7, 2013, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/investiga
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program, the NSA has also surreptitiously tapped into the physical
components of these companies’ cloud computing networks, gaining access
to unencrypted user data transmitted between secure data centers.12 A third
program, dubbed XKeyscore, provides government analysts with the
capacity to mine content and metadata generated by email, chat, and
browsing activities through a global network of servers and internet access
points operated by private entities.13
These leaked documents confirm previous reports about a
comprehensive domestic surveillance program that has been underway at
least since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.14 The current
revelations go much farther, however, providing credible evidence that
government agencies are collecting not only “metadata,” but also the
contents of all electronic communications that travel through infrastructure
located in the United States or one of its partner nations.15 Although
seemingly fantastic, it is increasingly difficult to discount accounts of such
programs. All the more so in light of the fact that the NSA is in the process
of building massive data centers capable of storing petabytes of
information.16 Why, after all, would the federal government’s premier
signals spy agency need such facilities if it was not engaged in a
commensurably massive data collection effort? Thus, it is a fairly safe bet
that the government is already, or soon will be, collecting and retaining all
of our electronic and telephonic communications, providing government
agents with contemporary and perpetual access to details about everywhere
we go and everything we do, say, or write when using or in the company of
technology.17

tions/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/
06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html.
12. Gellman & Soltani, supra note 8, at A1.
13. Glenn Greenwald, XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects “Nearly Everything a User Does
on the Internet,” GUARDIAN, July 31, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/
nsa-top-secret-program-online-data.
14. See THE SHADOW FACTORY, supra note 3, at 177-96; Bamford, The Black Box,
supra note 3; James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/
politics/16program.html?pagewanted=all; Michael Isikoff, The Fed Who Blew the Whistle,
NEWSWEEK (Dec. 12, 2008), available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/12/
12/the-fed-who-blew-the-whistle.html.
15. See sources cited supra notes 11-13; THE SHADOW FACTORY, supra note 3, at 21233.
16. See Bamford, The Black Box, supra note 3, at 80, 82-83.
17. See id. at 84; Isikoff, supra note 14; Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 14.
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As unsettling as these massive electronic surveillance programs are, they
are merely one branch of the rapidly expanding surveillance state in which
we live. Our public spaces are being overtaken by a growing archipelago of
observation systems deployed for public and private security, traffic
control, environmental monitoring, and innumerable other purposes.18
They are mounted to buildings, utility poles, cars, and sometimes people.19
They are transported through the ether on unmanned drones.20 Once kept in
silos, the inputs from these sources increasingly are aggregated and
analyzed by a nationwide network of fusion centers and local law
enforcement efforts like New York City’s Domain Awareness System,
developed in collaboration with Microsoft,21 or Virtual Alabama, which has
been developed by Google with its state partner.22 The inevitable end, if
not the intent and purpose, seems to be constant and pervasive observation
of everywhere we go, and everything we do, in public spaces.
Much of this expanding surveillance state intersects with or depends on
private entities. The internet and portable electronic devices have become
ubiquitous and play an increasingly central role in almost every aspect of
our lives.23 These technologies require us to share a vast amount of
information with third parties.24 We cannot buy things using credit cards
without sharing vendor information.25 Whether we are using landlines or
18. David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV.
62, 63-72 (2013).
19. See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the
Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1450-52 (2011) (noting that fusion
centers, where federal and state analysts share intelligence data, routinely look at everything
from traffic tickets and credit reports to video clips submitted by citizens).
20. See Lev Grossman, Drone Home, TIME MAG., Feb. 11, 2013, at 28, 31-33; Jennifer
Lynch, Are Drones Watching You?, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Jan. 10, 2012), https://www.
eff.org/deeplinks/2012/01/drones-are-watching-you. In the United States, “approximately
50 companies, universities, and government organizations are developing and producing
some 155 unmanned aircraft designs.” Lynch, supra. In 2010, expenditures on unmanned
aircraft in the United States exceeded three billion dollars and are expected to surpass seven
billion dollars over the next ten years. Id.
21. Gray & Citron, supra note 18, at 65-66.
22. Id. at 66-67.
23. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
24. Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
25. Cf. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440-43 (1976) (holding that bank
customers cannot raise a Fourth Amendment bar against government subpoena for bank
records documenting their transactions because banks and their customers are parties to the
underlying transactions, and customers must share information about those transactions with
their banks in order for the banks to perform their roles).
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cellular phones, we cannot make or receive calls without sharing call details
with our service providers,26 including our locations.27 Many of the apps
and concierge services we use on our phones, tablets, and computers cannot
function without knowing where we are.28 We cannot search or surf the
web without our search engines’ and internet service providers’ knowing
what we look for and where we go. Email services search the content of
our email in order to target us for the advertisements that subsidize their
services.29 Many web pages install cookies on our computers, or use other
tracking mechanisms, and then auction visual space in our browsers to
competing advertisers.30 We post to social networking sites. We blog. We
tweet. In short, there is an almost constant stream of data between us and
the corporate world, most of which goes unrecognized31 or unappreciated
until we receive an eerily insightful solicitation.32
Although few, if any, of us really grasp how much information we share
with institutional third parties, or know what they do with that information,
our naïveté is periodically challenged. For example, in a frequently
discussed article, the New York Times reported in 2012 that the retailer
Target uses information purchased from third parties in combination with
proprietary consumer data to identify newly pregnant women.33 Target
then, well, targets these women, sending coupons and offers for pregnancy
26. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
27. See 47 C.F.R. § 20.18(h)(1) (2014) (requiring cell phone carriers to use cell tower
information or GPS technology to locate phones that make 9-1-1 calls on their networks).
28. One example is the popular social networking site Foursquare, which gives
recommendations for services based on users’ current location. See About Foursquare,
FOURSQUARE, https://foursquare.com/about (last visited Apr. 10, 2014).
29. For example, this is the business model for Google’s Gmail service. See Ads in
Gmail, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/mail/answer/6603?hl=en (last visited Apr. 10,
2014).
30. See, e.g., Ad Targeting, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/adsense/answer/160
525?hl=en (last visited Apr. 10, 2014) (explaining the purpose and function of Google’s
Adwords).
31. For example, as Jennifer Golbeck reported recently, Facebook uses the content of
draft and unpublished posts to target advertisements. Jennifer Gollacek, On Second
Thought . . ., SLATE (Dec. 13, 2014), available at http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/
future_Tense2013/12/facebook_self_censorship_what_happens_to_the_posts_you_don_t_pu
blish.html.
32. See Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2012, at MM30,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html (recounting
how Target uses publicly available databases and market analytics to identify women who
are in the early stages of pregnancy).
33. Id.
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and baby products.34 In one of the cases reported by the Times, Target’s
marketing efforts notified a customer’s family that she was pregnant before
she did.35 Many of us have similar, though more routine, moments of
recognition when we see advertisements in our browsers pressing products
we looked at days or weeks earlier; or we receive word from vendors
thanking us for our interest in items we were linked to through an email
earlier in the day.
Roger Clarke foresaw the rise of this practice, which he dubbed
“dataveillance,” in the late 1980s.36 He would have categorized much of
the contemporary use of data in commerce as “personal” in so far as it
focuses on conduct that engages the attention of particular information
consumers.37 Clarke would categorize the more diffuse, and largely
indiscriminate, data gathering engaged in by the NSA as “mass
dataveillance.”38 These sorts of practices, often dubbed “Big Data” by
contemporary scholars, seek to gather as much information as possible with
the hope that subsequent analysis may reveal suspicious patterns of events
or even persons of interest.39 Here, the NSA is not alone. The National
Counterterrorism Center recently secured authority to gather from third
parties a broad range of information on every airline passenger entering the
United States, including travel history, financial data, and even medical
records.40 Under authority granted by the Affordable Care Act, passed in
2012, the Department of Health and Homeland Security, along with its
designees, can now require that agencies and healthcare providers collect
and report a wide range of patient information, including “race, ethnicity,
sex, primary language, and disability status.”41 Of course, government is
not the only Big Data player. Private data aggregators like Acxiom, who
have been dubbed “Big Brother’s Little Helpers” by Chris Hoofnagle, buy
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Roger A. Clarke, Information Technology and Dataveillance, 31 COMMC’NS OF
ACM 498, 498 (1988).
37. Id. at 502-03.
38. Id. at 503-04.
39. See David Gray, Danielle Keats Citron & Liz Clark Rinehart, Fighting Cybercrime
After United States v. Jones, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 745, 765-83 (2013).
40. Julia Angwin, U.S. Terror Agency to Tap Citizen Files, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2012,
at A1.
41. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 3101, 124
Stat. 119, 579 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300kk (2012)); see also Gray, Citron &
Rinehart, supra note 39, at 765-70; Frank Pasquale, Grand Bargains for Big Data: The
Emerging Law of Health Information, 72 MD. L. REV. 682, 683, 687 (2013).
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and collect mass quantities of information from a range of private and
public sources, which they then package and sell.42
There is no doubt that dataveillance, whether mass or personal, can serve
important governmental and commercial purposes.43 For example, Big
Data in the healthcare arena has the potential to facilitate medical
research,44 epidemiological forecasting,45 and efforts to combat fraud.46 It
also raises serious privacy concerns. As the breadth and scope of data
gathering and aggregation grow, the potential for bad information to leak
into the system increases.47 Given the high degree of data sharing and
largely uncritical interpenetration of databases,48 these errors can be quite
consequential for citizens, affecting their abilities to borrow, buy, or travel,
and sometimes harming their job prospects.49 Accurate and reliable
dataveillance may be even more dangerous, however.50 As Justice
Sotomayor has pointed out, granting government “unfettered discretion”51
to gather “comprehensive record[s]”52 that disclose details of “familial,
political, professional, religious, and sexual associations,”53 “chills
associational and expressive freedoms”54 while “alter[ing] the relationship
between citizen and government in a way that is inimical to a democratic
society.”55 It also raises fearsome specters of a surveillance state, leading
many commentators to draw vivid analogies to literary dystopias.56
42. Hoofnagle, supra note 5, at 595-96.
43. See Gray, Citron & Rinehart, supra note 39, at 765-800.
44. See Pasquale, supra note 41, at 683
45. Jody Ray Bennett, The Big Data Contagion, DATAVERSITY (June 21, 2012),
http://www.dataversity.net/the-big-data-contagion/.
46. See Gray, Citron, & Rinehart, supra note 39, at 770-82.
47. Gray & Citron, supra note 18, at 80-81.
48. Id. at 119-20; Citron & Pasquale, supra note 19, at 1443.
49. Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249,
1273-77 (2008).
50. Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 2 (2008) (“Government’s most important technique of control is no longer watching
or threatening to watch. It is analyzing and drawing connections between data.”); Gray &
Citron, supra note 18, at 82.
51. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954-56 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
53. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
55. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d
272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)).
56. Gray & Citron, supra note 18, at 76 n.88 (quoting GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN
EIGHTY-FOUR 4 (1949)); Roberts & Ackerman, supra note 6 (quoting the ACLU’s Jameel
Jaffer as characterizing the NSA’s telephonic surveillance program as being “beyond
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Given these privacy concerns, one might expect that the Fourth
Amendment, which guards “reasonable expectation[s] of privacy,”57 would
impose some constraints on the government’s ability to engage in
dataveillance. Under present doctrine, however, it does not. This is due
primarily to a long line of cases standing for the general proposition that,
when you share information with others, you assume the risk that those
whom you trust will pass it along to the government, whether on their own
initiative or in response to a subpoena, warrant, or other “lawful process.”58
Although one member of the Court is ready to reconsider this “third party
doctrine” in light of governmental efforts to engage in mass data collection
and aggregation,59 the Court has yet to take up the question.60 In the
meantime, government agents continue to exploit the third party doctrine to
facilitate their expanding surveillance programs. It is precisely this lacuna

Orwellian”); cf. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 466 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The
Fourth Amendment demands that we temper our efforts to apprehend criminals with a
concern for the impact on our fundamental liberties of the methods we use. I hope it will be
a matter of concern to my colleagues that the police surveillance methods they would
sanction were among those described 40 years ago in George Orwell’s dread vision of life in
the 1980’s.”); Bill Keller, Op-Ed., Living with the Surveillance State, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
2013, at A17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/17/opinion/keller-living-withthe -surveillance-state.html (likening the Domain Awareness System, an interconnected
system of CCTV cameras and law enforcement databases in Britain, to Orwell’s “Big
Brother” of Nineteen Eighty-Four).
57. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
58. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741-42 (1979); United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435, 440-43 (1976); Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 55 (1974); United
States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 777 (1971); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
As is common in this area of Fourth Amendment law, the Standards overstate the rule
described by the third party doctrine, which surely does not provide that “one typically
retains no federal constitutional reasonable expectation of privacy in information conveyed
to a third party.” See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS
TO THIRD PARTY RECORDS 6 (3d ed. 2013) [hereinafter LEATPR STANDARDS]. Individual
standards will be referred to using the format ‘STANDARD x.x.’ Were this the rule then Katz
would have been wrongly decided—after all, Katz did by definition share everything
overheard by the government’s electronic listening device with the parties to his phone calls.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
59. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
60. There are several lawsuits working their way through the courts that may present the
Court with an opportunity to reconsider the third party doctrine. See, e.g., ACLU v. Clapper,
959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 752 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that the NSA’s telephony metadata
collection program is constitutional under the third- party doctrine); Klayman v. Obama, 957
F. Supp. 2d 1, 37 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding that the NSA’s telephony metadata collection
program is unconstitutional despite the third party doctrine).
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that the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice on Law Enforcement Access
to Third Party Records (LEATPR Standards) propose to span.
Recognizing the privacy implications of dataveillance, and even
governmental access to discrete, but revelatory, bits of personal data, the
LEATPR Standards propose super-constitutional constraints on law
enforcement access to information held by institutional third parties. These
efforts are neither unprecedented nor unwelcome.61 Since its inception, the
third party doctrine has been a point of considerable concern for citizens
and scholars alike.62 In the face of those worries, the political branches
have taken action to guarantee some degree of privacy in certain shared
information, even if the Constitution guarantees none. For example, in the
face of concerns about the use of pen register devices, which were
sanctioned by the Court in Smith v. Maryland,63 Congress passed the Pen
Register Act64 as part of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986 (ECPA).65 Among its more important provisions, the Pen Register
Act limits telephone companies’ use of these devices for their own purposes
and imposes a requirement for a court order for any law enforcement use.66
In the wake of concerns about the disclosure of video rental histories raised
during the confirmation proceedings for Supreme Court nominee Robert
Bork, Congress passed the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA).67 The
VPPA requires that video rental businesses maintain the privacy of their
customers’ viewing habits and interposes courts between law enforcement
and video rental companies.68
In contrast to these past efforts, we have yet to see any significant
legislative reactions to growing concerns about dataveillance and

61. For examples of extra-constitutional legislative constraints on law enforcement
surveillance efforts, see infra notes 64-68. For prior examples of ABA model standards, see
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE SECTION A:
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS (3d ed. 2001); ABA STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE SECTION B: TECHNOLOGICALLYASSISTED PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE (3d ed. 1999).
62. See, e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the ‘Legitimate
Expectation of Privacy’, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1314-15 (1981).
63. 442 U.S. at 745-46.
64. Pen/Trap Statute (Pen Register Act), Pub. L. No. 99-508, Title III, 100 Stat. 1868
(1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2012)).
65. Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
66. 18 U.S.C. § 3121 (2012).
67. Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012)).
68. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(2)(C).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss4/8

2014]

ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY RECORDS

929

widespread government access to data shared with third parties. Although
some judges and scholars hold out hope that Congress will step in,69 it has
yet to do so in any meaningful way. Even in the face of recent revelations
about general warrants for telephonic metadata,70 which were issued by the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to the FBI and NSA under the
auspices of the Foreign Surveillance Intelligence Act, there seems to be
little interest in establishing new constraints, despite calls by a small
minority of legislators.71 Other commentators hope that the executive will
restrain itself, but there is very little reason to think that it can or will given
current efforts by the FBI and NSA to defend their widespread data
gathering and to avoid any meaningful outside review.72
In the face of these legislative, executive, and judicial failures, the
LEATPR Standards are agnostic as to which regime73—legislative,
executive, or judicial—should bear the burden of action. They instead try
to chart a regulatory structure that conceivably could be adopted and
implemented as part of a judicial order, a legislative enactment, or an
executive policy.74 As a consequence, the Standards do not take a position
on whether current data-sharing practices between institutional third parties
and law enforcement raise any constitutional concerns. Rather, they start
from the premise that there is something creepy going on and then take a

69. E.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring); Orin
Kerr, Technology, Privacy, and the Courts: A Reply to Colb and Swire, 102 MICH. L. REV.
933, 943 (2004).
70. Gray & Citron, supra note 18, at 119.
71. The exception is the Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of
2013, S. 607, 113th Cong. (2013) & H.R. 1847, 113th Cong. (2013), which would require
police to get a warrant for production of information and to provide notice to those whose
records were sought. The Bill was reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee on April
25, 2013, but has yet to clear the House Committee. None of the revelations about NSA and
FBI surveillance and dataveillance in the intervening months seem to have moved the ball.
72. Not surprisingly, this is the approach advocated by the NSA. See In re Application
of F.B.I. for an Order Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things from [Redacted], No. BR 13-80,
at 3-6 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. Apr. 25, 2013) (describing “minimization”
procedures adopted within the NSA and FBI to limit access to and use of telephonic
metadata). For a discussion of these procedures, see Gray & Citron, supra note 18, at 11923.
73. I take this use of “regime” from Akhil Amar, who has long pressed for each of the
three constitutional branches of government, or regimes, to do its part in protecting Fourth
Amendment rights. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
FIRST PRINCIPLES 43-45 (1997).
74. STANDARD 25-3.4.
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brave stab at both describing and addressing that creepiness without taking
any position on whether or how the Constitution is implicated.
Although there is broad agreement that there is something creepy about
the expanding scope of government’s access to the products of data
aggregation and discrete surveillance performed by third parties, that
consensus quickly falls apart once one starts to focus on why it is creepy
and what can or should be done. Some think that “creepy” is as far as it
goes, and that contemporary norms, commerce, economics, and the realities
of modern politics augur against any governmental intervention.75 Others
argue that programs of broad governmental surveillance, whether
accomplished directly or through third parties, is socially destructive and
constitutionally infirm.76 While stopping well short of hysteria, the
Standards take seriously the impact on privacy of expanding data-sharing
relationships between the government and private parties.77 Nothing that
follows in this essay will attempt to dissuade contributors and consumers
from this view. Rather, it will argue that the approach taken by the
Standards is conceptually and practically fraught.
Although far too short to provide a conclusive case, this essay will argue
that the LEATPR Standards adopt a strategy that is likely to fail and instead
promote a regulatory framework that poses serious threats to core interests
in individual liberty and functioning democracy that lie behind privacy
claims. The strategic error is located in the Standards’ refusal to find some
constitutional ground that might demonstrate the necessity and sufficiency
of its provisions. Part II provides a brief overview of some of the critical
decisions reflected in the Standards. Parts III and IV explore the
consequences of these choices. Part V turns to the regulatory framework
proposed by the Standards and focuses in particular on the decision to
govern access to information held by third parties according to a spectrum
of privacy interests, which ranges from “highly private” to “not private.”78
Although this approach has a certain intuitive appeal, the project of
describing these categories and assigning values to information poses a
serious threat to individual autonomy, political neutrality, and democratic
norms. In the end, these criticisms are self-defeating. After all, it is hard to
get too spun up about the dangers of a regulatory framework that is doomed
never to be adopted in the first place. They are offered here nevertheless in

75.
76.
77.
78.

Kerr, supra note 69, at 943.
Gray & Citron, supra note 18, at 101-24.
LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 58, at 4-5.
Id. at 9-11.
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the hope that they may be of some assistance to those seeking to step into
the regulatory fray as they consider other alternatives.79
II. An Overview of the LEATPR Standards’ Basic Approach
As a prelude to the discussion that follows, it is worth highlighting a few
features of the LEATPR Standards that raise some concerns. The first of
these is the Standards’ agnosticism with respect to constitutional issues.80
The Standards’ Introduction emphasizes this posture, pointing out that “the
Standards do not purport to interpret the federal constitution nor any state
equivalent, nor the many statutes and administrative regulations that
regulate law enforcement access to third party records.”81 Thus, the
Standards do not challenge the third party doctrine or otherwise tether the
project of general reform, or the specific provisions set forth by the
Standards, to any constitutional theory. This agnosticism raises two very
important issues and potential points of concern.
The first is the question of constitutional sufficiency. Standard 25-2.2
makes clear that any efforts to adopt and apply the Standards, in whole or in
part, cannot “authorize a protection less than that required by the federal
Constitution, nor less than that required by its respective state
Constitution.”82 Although considerate,83 this provision just highlights the
possibility that the Standards are constitutionally infirm. As we shall see in
a moment, this is a significant worry in present circumstances, where new
technologies and expanding surveillance regimes have opened the third
party doctrine, the public observation doctrine, and other seemingly wellestablished Fourth Amendment rules to new constitutional challenges.

79. Among these is a proposal that Danielle Citron and I have advanced, which would
focus on regulating the technologies that are used to facilitate programs of dataveillance.
Gray & Citron, supra note 18, at 101-24.
80. See LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 58, at 9 (“Fortunately, it is not necessary for
purposes of these Standards to answer these constitutional questions.”). It appears that this
agnosticism reflects a decision by the ABA rather than the drafters, at least some of whom
sought to ground the Standards in claims of constitutional necessity. Stephen Henderson,
Professor, University of Oklahoma College of Law, Remarks at the Oklahoma Law Review
Symposium: Law Enforcement Access to Third Party Records (Nov. 15, 2013). Perhaps the
points made here will be of some assistance in persuading the ABA to change its view when
and if the Standards are considered for review and revision.
81. Id. at 9.
82. STANDARD 25-2.2.
83. Standard 25-2.2 is gratuitous, after all. By definition, the Standards could never
hope to justify legislation or administrative practice that is constitutionally deficient.
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The second concern derived from the Standards’ constitutional
agnosticism is the question of constitutional necessity. Returning to
Standard 25-2.2, the Standards do not take a position on what protections
are or should be demanded by federal or state constitutions. For example,
the Standards do not challenge the third party doctrine or imply a
constitutionally grounded expectation of privacy in information shared with
third parties, whether that information is “highly private” or only
“moderately private.”84 As a consequence, the Standards provide no
constitutional impetus for either the project or its components, relying
instead on the political process to carry the full mantle of motive and action.
As is discussed below, there is very good reason to doubt that the Standards
will have any effect if their fate is left to legislatures and executives.
Although public responses to recent revelations about NSA surveillance
raise some hope that the political will to adopt rules along the lines
described by the Standards may be there, persistent linkages between
surveillance and national security make it hard to be too sunny in the
context of our perpetual war on terror. Those concerns are particularly
salient given the Standards’ specific refusal to regulate any governmental
efforts to access third party records in the context of national security
investigations.85 That exclusion may well render the whole project
academic in the most pejorative sense of the word.
These concerns are amplified by the fact that the Standards take no
position on who should be the prime mover in promoting reform. Among
those who think that the gathering and sharing of personal information by
third parties should be regulated, there is considerable disagreement about
who is best placed to develop and enforce regulations. Some think that the
market should take the lead, with companies competing for consumers
based in part on how much data they gather, how long they keep it, how
they share it, and how vigorously they contest government attempts to gain
access.86
Others favor the political branches, and legislatures in

84. STANDARD 25-4.1.
85. STANDARD 25-2.1(a).
86. For example, this perspective is at the heart of the “do not track” movement in
browser technology, which has been driven largely by consumer demand. See FED. TRADE
COMM’N, PRELIMINARY STAFF REPORT: PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF
RAPID CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 63-69
(2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-tradecommission-bureau-consumer-protection-preliminary-ftc-staff-report-protecting-consumer/
101201privacyreport.pdf.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss4/8

2014]

ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY RECORDS

933

particular.87 Some maintain that the privacy issues rise to a constitutional
level, and therefore require court intervention—if only to force sluggish
elected officials to action.88 The Standards remain agnostic on these
questions as well.89 Thus, the Standards are offered as a framework that
could be adopted by “legislatures, courts acting in their supervisory
capacities, [or] administrative agencies.”90
The final feature of the Standards that will guide the discussion here is
their focus on the contents of third party records sought by government
agents rather than other regulatory targets. Even among those who agree on
the best forum for regulation, there is considerable disagreement on what
approach to take. Some have focused on how much data is gathered or
shared.91 Others have focused on how long surveillance is conducted.92
Among the more prominent proponents of these “quantitative” approaches
are Christopher Slobogin93 and the four justices who joined Justice Alito’s
concurring opinion in United States v. Jones.94 A third group has made the
case for focusing on how surveillance is accomplished. With my coauthor
Danielle Citron, I have made the case for this method-centered approach,
which would regulate both direct and indirect governmental access to and
use of surveillance and data aggregation technologies capable of effecting
broad programs of indiscriminate surveillance.95 A fourth group of scholars
87. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (Alito, J., concurring); Kerr, supra note
69, at 943.
88. Gray & Citron, supra note 18, at 69-70, 112.
89. LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 58, at 9 (“Fortunately, it is not necessary for
purposes of these Standards to answer these constitutional questions. Although decision
makers will of course be bound by constitutional decisions (see Standard 25-2.2), the
Standards do not purport to interpret the federal constitution nor any state equivalent, nor the
many statutes and administrative regulations that regulate law enforcement access to third
party records. They instead carefully consider all of these, and other sources, in providing a
framework via which decision makers, including legislatures, courts acting in their
supervisory capacities, and administrative agencies, can answer such questions, thereby
thoughtfully and consistently regulating government access to third party records.”).
90. Id.
91. This “mosaic” theory is credited to Judge Ginsburg’s opinion for the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d
544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
92. Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance
Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1
(2012).
93. Id.
94. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962-64 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
95. Gray & Citron, supra note 18.
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and policy makers argues that regulations should focus on what kinds of
data and information are gathered and shared.96 For example, Neil Richards
has argued that we should be most concerned with surveillance that gathers
information implicating “intellectual privacy.”97 The Standards also favor
this content-based approach. As we shall see, there are good reasons to
worry that this choice may compromise core commitments to individual
liberty, among other core democratic principles.98
III. The Consequences of Constitutional Agnosticism
Although there are many historical narratives explaining the current state
and history of Fourth Amendment law and doctrine, one of the most
compelling is the courts’ deployments of Fourth Amendment principles and
applications of founding-era analogies to address changes in law
enforcement practice and advancing surveillance technology. Take, for
examples, the exclusionary rule and the Katz doctrine. During the founding
era, and well into the nineteenth century, there were no professionalized
police forces.99 Law enforcement was largely motivated by private action
with minimal assistance provided by constables, who were more often
criticized for their sloth than for their aggressive search and seizure
practices.100 Although colonials had experience with writs of assistance,
these general warrants were used largely to facilitate tax enforcement and
trade policy rather than to advance general law enforcement purposes or for
government intelligence gathering.101 As a consequence, the sorts of police
conduct that concern us today—invasive home searches, routine searches
and seizures on the street, ex parte custodial interrogations, widespread
surveillance, and ubiquitous dataveillance—were not part of the American
96. See State v. Earls, 70 A.3d 630, 641-43 (N.J. 2013).
97. Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935-36
(2013); Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 403-04 (2008).
98. Danielle Citron and I have made this case against Professor Richards. See Danielle
Keats Citron & David Gray, Addressing the Harm of Total Surveillance: A Reply to
Professor Neil Richards, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 262 (2013).
99. Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV.
547, 620-21 (1999); Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Neglected History of Criminal Procedure,
1850-1940, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 447, 447-48 (2010); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts
About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 824 (1994).
100. See Davies, supra note 99, at 641; Oliver, supra note 99, at 452, 456; Lawrence
Rosenthal, Pragmatism, Originalism, Race, and the Case Against Terry v. Ohio, 43 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 299, 342 (2010) (quoting ROGER LANE, POLICING THE CITY: BOSTON 18221885, at 6-7 (1967)).
101. Oliver, supra note 99, at 450, 456-57.
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imagination in 1791. It is therefore impossible to make the case that the
Fourth Amendment originally was intended or understood to curb police
excesses. There simply were no police forces of any consequence and
therefore no serious excesses to curb. The landscape began to change in the
mid-nineteenth century as urban centers like New York City began to
incorporate professional, paramilitary-style police forces and to endow
those forces with broad authority to use force and violence in the service of
detecting, preventing, and prosecuting crime.102 Police units quickly
became institutions unto themselves, described by enterprise goals,
populated by careerists, and vulnerable to political manipulation and
corruption.103 What followed was an era of expanding police departments,
increasing police powers, and more invasive and oppressive police
practices,
including
searches,
detentions,
and
“third-degree”
interrogations.104
Faced with these dramatic changes, courts started to take action. The
primary result was a series of cases, beginning with Boyd v. United States105
in 1886 and culminating in Mapp v. Ohio106 in 1961, in which courts at both
the federal and state levels began excluding from trial evidence that was
found or seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Courts adopting
this new exclusionary rule justified their actions on grounds of both
constitutional principle and pragmatic necessity.107
There is little doubt that the exclusionary rule represented a significant
doctrinal novation. Prior to 1886, there is no persuasive evidence that the
prospect of excluding otherwise reliable evidence acquired as a result of an
illegal search or seizure garnered any sympathy in American courts.108
102. Id. at 448, 459.
103. Id. at 459-60, 493.
104. The widely influential Wickersham Report, which the Court relied on in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-47 (1966), defines the “third degree” as “the use of physical
brutality, or other forms of cruelty, to obtain involuntary confessions or admissions.” 11
NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW
ENFORCEMENT 4 (1931).
105. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
106. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
107. David Gray, A Spectacular Non Sequitur: The Supreme Court’s Contemporary
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Jurisprudence, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 13-19 (2013).
108. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757, 786-87 (1994) (quoting United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 843-44
(C.C.D. Mass. 1822); Commonwealth v. Dana, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 329, 337 (1841) (“If the
search warrant were illegal, or if the officer serving the warrant exceeded his authority, the
party on whose complaint the warrant issued, or the officer, would be responsible for the
wrong done; but this is no good reason for excluding the papers seized as evidence, if they
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Rather, it arrived on the scene only in response to changes in the nature of
law enforcement, the scope of police powers, and the increasing
invasiveness of police practices.109 The exclusionary rule marks the courts’
response to these changes and to the persistent inability of the political
branches to regulate police conduct with any sustained effectiveness. As the
Court reported in Elkins v. United States, “neither administrative, criminal
nor civil remedies are effective in suppressing lawless searches and
seizures.”110 By contrast, the exclusionary rule had almost immediate
salutary effects when and where it was adopted, reducing Fourth
Amendment violations, increasing training and therefore the
professionalism of police officers, and expanding engagements between
law enforcement and prosecutors.111
The exclusionary rule was and remains controversial, of course. It is
also persistently targeted by several current justices on the Supreme
Court.112 We can leave these debates aside for the moment, however, and
simply take note of the historical fact that the exclusionary rule marks a
doctrinal adaptation to changes in the nature of law enforcement
institutions, their powers, and their practices. Absent those changes, we
likely would not have an exclusionary rule at all; and, absent the
exclusionary rule, we likely would live in a world where illegal searches
and other abuses of power were far more common. To see some of what
that world might look like, we need look no further than fields of policecitizen engagements liberated from serious court scrutiny by those
exceptions to the exclusionary rule that contribute to what I have described

were pertinent to the issue, as they unquestionably were.”)). As Akhil Amar has pointed out,
the exclusive remedies for illegal searches and seizures prior to 1886 were to be found in
common law trespass. Id. at 774; see also id. at 787 (“As late as 1883, the leading evidence
treatise clearly proclaimed illegally procured evidence admissible . . . .”); William C.
Heffernan, Foreword, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional
Remedy, 88 GEO. L.J. 799, 808 (2000) (noting the Court’s departure from the common law
trespass as the exclusive remedy for illegal searches and seizures); Potter Stewart, The Road
to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary
Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1372-77 (1983) (same). Roger
Roots recently has disputed this common wisdom in The Originalist Case for the Fourth
Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 1 (2010). For a brief critique of his views,
see Gray, supra note 107, at 14 n.82.
109. See id. at 13-26.
110. 364 U.S. 206, 220 (1960) (quoting People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 913 (Cal. 1955)).
111. Id. at 219-21.
112. See Gray, supra note 107, at 16-21.
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elsewhere as the Court’s contemporary silver platter doctrine.113 These
include grand jury investigations,114 immigration enforcement,115 civil tax
proceedings,116 and parole enforcement.117 In each of these arenas, we can
see both examples of unchecked Fourth Amendment violations and the
threat and potential for more widespread abuses.
The rule announced in Katz v. United States reinforces this narrative of
doctrinal adaptation to historical changes in police power and practice.118
Although not specified in the text of the Fourth Amendment, for at least a
century after ratification, “search” was understood in reference to concepts
of common law trespass.119 As a consequence, Fourth Amendment rights
were tied to property rights.120 On this point, Olmstead v. United States is
most often cited.121 There, the Court held that intercepting telephone
conversations using wiretapping technology did not constitute a Fourth
Amendment “search” because deploying and using that technology did not
require a physical invasion of the home.122
The Court’s views on wiretapping began to shift over the next several
decades, both as telephones became a more common feature of daily life
and as wiretapping took a more prominent place in the law enforcement
toolbox.123 That shift culminated with Katz in 1967.124 There, the Court
113. David Gray, Meagan Cooper, & David McAloon, The Supreme Court’s
Contemporary Silver Platter Doctrine, 91 TEX. L. REV. 7 (2012).
114. Id. at 21-25.
115. Id. at 25-36.
116. Id. at 46.
117. Id. at 36-46.
118. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
119. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (“The text of the Fourth
Amendment reflects its close connection to property, since otherwise it would have referred
simply to ‘the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures’;
the phrase ‘in their persons, houses, papers, and effects’ would have been superfluous.”); see
also Slobogin, supra note 92, at 3-4. But see Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth
Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 67, 68-69 (arguing that the trespass test of Fourth
Amendment searches is a myth created by the Court in Katz).
120. Amar, supra note 108, at 786.
121. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
122. Id. at 466. In a spirited dissent, Justice Brandeis argued that this property-based
approach to the Fourth Amendment was anachronistic. Id. at 473-74 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting). That dissent drew on work that Justice Brandeis did in his groundbreaking
article The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890), which he co-wrote with Samuel D.
Warren.
123. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 471-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Oliver, supra note 99, at
460-61; see also DAVID R. JOHNSON, POLICING THE URBAN UNDERWORLD: THE IMPACT OF
CRIME ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN POLICE, 1800-1887, at 4-9, 29-40 (1979).
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concluded that “the underpinnings of Olmstead . . . [had] been so
eroded . . . that the ‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can no longer be
regarded as controlling.”125 In its place, the Court adopted the view that the
Fourth Amendment “protects people, not places,”126 and formulated a new
definition of “search” organized around reasonable expectations of
privacy.127 Under this standard, the Court held that surreptitiously listening
to telephone conversations constitutes a “search” because citizens
reasonably expect that those conversations are private.128
Like the exclusionary rule, the Katz doctrine marks an adaptation of
constitutional doctrine to changes in law enforcement and society that has
no doubt had significant salutary effects on the relationships between
citizens and law enforcement. Just to cite one example, Katz impelled
adoption of the Wiretap Act.129 Absent Katz, the concept of the Fourth
Amendment search likely would remain limited by the law of trespass,130
and the use of wiretapping would be left to the unfettered discretion of law
enforcement. As recent experiences show, efforts by law enforcement to
self-regulate or efforts by legislatures to limit government access to
surveillance technologies solely through extra-constitutional means would
be very unlikely to have imposed any real restraint on the use of
wiretapping technology. It took a shift in constitutional doctrine to impel
legislative action
124. Katz, 389 U.S. 347. Berger v. New York, decided in the term prior to Katz, set the
stage while also providing specific guidance to Congress as it considered its legislative
options. 388 U.S. 41, 54-60 (1967). In Berger, the Court found that New York’s regulatory
regime governing wiretapping was constitutionally insufficient. Id. at 63-64.
125. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
126. Id. at 351.
127. Id. at 351-52.
128. Id. at 352 (noting that telephone booths function as spaces of aural repose in which
citizens may reasonably expect that their communications will not be monitored by
“uninvited ear[s]”).
129. See HOWARD J. KAPLAN ET AL., THE HISTORY AND LAW OF WIRETAPPING 4 (2012),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/
sac_2012/29-1_history_and_law_of_wiretapping.authcheckdam.pdf
(“Congress
therefore
regarded Katz and Berger as instructive on how to draft a constitutionally sound wiretapping
law and thereafter passed the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968. Title III of that Act
addresses interception of communications and remains to this day the law that governs the
federal use of wiretaps.”).
130. As the Court recently has made clear, the trespass-based approach to defining
Fourth Amendment “search” remains in force. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945,
949-51 (2012); id. at 954-55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). The Katz doctrine marks a
doctrinal addition that can enhance, but not degrade, rights and protections.
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The LEATPR Standards break from this pattern. There can be no doubt
that the rules and regulations promoted by the Standards are designed to
contend with dramatic changes in society, surveillance technology, and law
enforcement practice. In its current form, Fourth Amendment doctrine is
unable to meet these challenges. If past is prologue, then we might expect a
doctrinal reaction. The Court came close in United States v. Jones, with
five justices expressing support for a “quantitative” approach to assessing
Fourth Amendment rights and protections that would respond to enhanced
surveillance and data aggregation technologies.131 Justice Sotomayor went
a step further, suggesting that law enforcement’s increasing reliance on
these technologies may make it “necessary to reconsider the premise that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information
voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”132 Nevertheless, the LEATPR
Standards explicitly decline to propose or promote a constitutional
foundation for the overall project of reform or for the rules and regulations
that comprise the core of its proposals. This raises serious concerns.
Foremost among these are questions of constitutional sufficiency and
necessity. Although the Standards are not grounded by any proposed
change in Fourth Amendment law or doctrine, there can be little doubt that
such a change is coming. When it does, the Standards will face questions
of constitutional sufficiency and necessity. At that point, the Standards
might well turn out to be constitutionally infirm. They might also turn out
to be largely gratuitous. Absent some kind of constitutional commitment
on the part of the Standards that is linked to its regulatory proposals, there
is simply no way to know.
This mystery marks a significant barrier against adoption. After all, the
Standards propose significant changes in current practice and even require
the development of new internal control structures within police agencies.
It is hard to see why the political branches would make these changes
without some idea that they are both necessary and sufficient to meet
constitutional demands. Here, the Wiretap Act provides a helpful example.
Although Katz did not squarely overrule Olmstead, combined with Berger
v. New York, it described the Fourth Amendment theory and doctrine that
would govern wiretapping going forward. Acting on this advice, Congress
passed the Wiretap Act,133 which limits law enforcement access to
131. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949-51; id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 962-65
(Alito, J., concurring with Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, JJ.).
132. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
133. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat.
197 (codified in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
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wiretapping technology by requiring warrants and court monitoring of all
active wiretaps.134 Those new rules and regulations clearly were tied to the
doctrinal changes effected by Katz, and as a consequence have been largely
immune to constitutional challenge. Although the Standards do not yet
have the benefit of a Katz for the twenty-first century, they could go quite
far in meeting concerns about their constitutional status if they were tied to
a Fourth Amendment theory—novel though it might be.
The absence of an underlying Fourth Amendment theory that would
buttress the Standards also raises serious questions about the Standards’
effectiveness in practice. As the courts’ experiences with alternatives to the
exclusionary rule show, law enforcement agencies caught up in the
“competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”135 largely are incapable of
self-regulation and immune to meaningful legislative regulation. Although
the Standards describe a role for the courts in reviewing some efforts to
gain access to some information held by some third parties,136 the overall
scheme remains a free-flying balloon from a constitutional point of view.
As a consequence, courts remain powerless to compel adoption of the
Standards or to review law enforcement conduct governed by the
Standards.137 Here again, the Wiretap Act provides a useful model. Linked
as it is to Katz, there can be no doubt that courts have the right and the duty
both to limit government access to wiretapping technology and to enforce
the overall regulatory scheme. Because of their studiously agnostic stance
with respect to constitutional issues, the Standards can make no such claim.
Finally, in the absence of some kind of constitutional impetus, the
Standards run full-force into the concerns described in the next section
relating to the vagaries of the political process. Acting in the wake of
Berger and Katz, Congress had little choice but to regulate wiretapping.
Furthermore, had Congress failed to act, there can be no doubt that the
courts would have. Absent that Fourth Amendment sword of Damocles,
there is no reason to think that the Wiretap Act would have been adopted,
stable, or effective in any sustained way. The challenges posed by
contemporary surveillance and dataveillance technologies are greater by far
than those posed by wiretapping in 1968. Thus, absent some kind of
134. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2012).
135. United States v. Johnson, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
136. See STANDARD 25-5.3.
137. The Standards suggest that its regulations could be imposed on law enforcement by
courts exercising their “supervisory authority.” STANDARD 25-3.4. As is discussed below,
the project described by the Standards exceeds the scope of that authority absent some claim
of constitutional necessity.
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constitutional driver that can both compel action by the political branches
and constrain the outcome of that action, there is serious doubt that the
Standards will be either adopted or effective.
This may seem to put the LEATPR Standards and their drafters in a
Catch-22: If the Standards adopt a constitutional theory under which the
provisions described are constitutionally necessary, then there is really no
reason for the Standards in the first place. Alternatively, if the Standards
are not constitutionally necessary, then they will not be adopted and may
not even meet constitutional demands. That is not where the foregoing
critique leaves the Standards, however. Questions relating to what the
Fourth Amendment allows law enforcement to do in their engagements
with citizens’ “persons, houses, papers, and effects” have been a constant
since the rise of professionalized police forces in the mid-nineteenth
century. The point pressed here is that they are constitutional questions. If
the Standards were grounded in a prescribed doctrinal adaptation, as were
the exclusionary rule and the Wiretap Act, then they could be quite useful
in providing guidance to courts, legislatures, and law enforcement agencies.
Absent a clear account of what that constitutional adaptation to
contemporary surveillance technologies, techniques, and practices looks
like, there is serious doubt that they will be very influential or useful.
There is a risk, of course, that, were the Standards to abandon their
agnosticism, then the constitutional theory they adopt may turn out to be
wrong. That possibility should not deter supporters from taking the
constitutional plunge, however. Consider the possibilities: The Standards
might get the constitutional question right, demonstrating both necessity
and parsimony in the provisions proposed. That, of course, would be an
ideal outcome. Alternatively, the Standards might undershoot on the
constitutional front, with the consequence that the provisions would later
turn out to be constitutionally insufficient. Of course, if that’s the case,
then the Standards are already a failed enterprise. That failure would not be
lessened by the decision to offer a constitutional foundation from the outset.
Finally, if the Standards turn out to be constitutionally sufficient, but in
some ways also gratuitous, then they would be in no worse position than
they are now. In other words, there really is nothing to lose by grounding
the Standards in a constitutional theory. Quite to the contrary, there is
everything to be gained.
IV. Consequences of Relying on the Political Process
Because the Standards are not grounded in any claim of constitutional
necessity or sufficiency, responsibility for adopting and enforcing their
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provisions is left to “legislatures, courts acting in their supervisory
capacities, and administrative agencies.”138 This ultimately means that the
fate of the Standards and their proscriptions is left entirely in the hands of
the political process. Given past experience and recent revelations, this
strategy is likely to fail. It may even be dangerous to the overall project of
imposing reasonable constraints on law enforcement access to records held
by third parties. The fact that the Standards do not reach post-arrest
investigations or national security investigations only makes matters
worse.139 This section explores some of these concerns.
To start, we can set aside any real hope that the courts will impose the
Standards or any of their constituent provisions absent a claim of
constitutional necessity. Courts’ supervisory authorities simply do not
stretch that far.140 Appellate courts have some supervisory authority over
the procedures adopted by their inferior courts. Trial courts have limited
authority to set the rules governing the conduct of parties that appear before
them in particular cases.141 But courts and litigants are not the main
regulatory targets for the Standards, which concern themselves primarily
with police procedure. The discretionary authority granted to courts simply
does not extend to the conduct of police during the course of
investigations—at least not without a specific legislative grant or a claim of
constitutional necessity.142 Thus, any attempt by a court to impose the

138. LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 58, at 9.
139. See STANDARD 25-2.1(a)-(b).
140. See Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases:
Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 1433, 1455, 1464-94 (1984) (pointing out that the Court’s exercise of its supervisory
powers has been limited to efforts to “promote the search for the truth, to protect the
integrity of the courts, to remedy violations of individual rights, and to impose sanctions
against government misconduct” and arguing that much of even these limited efforts
constitute overreach).
141. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a).
142. The Supreme Court’s limited claim of supervisory authority over law enforcement
arises from its decision in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), superseded in part
by 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2012). Even in that case, however, the Court limited the compass of
its own power to review law enforcement practices to those circumstances where “courts
themselves become instruments of law enforcement” by explicitly or implicitly endorsing
illegal conduct. Id. at 347. Given the fact that any law enforcement efforts that would be
regulated by the Standards are by definition legal under the Court’s own third party doctrine,
it is hard to see where the Court, or any court, could find authority to exercise supervisory
powers over law enforcement without first holding that current practices are unconstitutional
or otherwise illegal.
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Standards or its provisions based solely on its supervisory authority would
almost certainly run afoul of basic separation of powers principles.143
Take Miranda warnings as a point of comparison. The Miranda
warnings comprise perhaps the most minimal imposition on police
procedure one could imagine. Nevertheless, the Court has been quite clear
that its ability to require Miranda warnings derives from its constitutional
authority, not from some discretionary, supervisory power over law
enforcement.144 It is hard to see how the Court, or any court, could mandate
prophylactic measures as complex as the Standards based solely on a claim
of supervisory authority when something as simple as Miranda warnings
must be grounded in a claim of constitutional necessity.
Nothing would seem to change if the Standards were recast as rules of
evidence. The Standards do not attach themselves to traditional common
law rules of evidence such as relevance, reliability, prejudice, or hearsay,
and it is hard to see how they could. Furthermore, few courts have sole
authority over the rules of evidence they apply, instead sharing that power
with legislatures.145 Thus, if a court were to create a new category of
evidentiary rules based solely on supervisory powers, without any footing
in either the common law or the Constitution, that effort would be patent
overreach.146 At any rate, the courts’ sole remedy for violations of the
Standards if they are treated as rules of evidence is exclusion of evidence
acquired from third party records. Even at its most expansive, the Court
has never deployed exclusion as a remedy in the absence of some claim of
illegality.147 It is hard to see how a violation of the Standards could
constitute illegal conduct unless they are adopted as law by the political
branches or backed by a finding of constitutional necessity from the courts.
143. Beale, supra note 140, at 1473-74 (“Although the term ‘procedure’ may properly be
defined more broadly for other purposes, separation of power principles provide strong
support for the application of the narrow definition when the issue is the scope of the federal
courts’ implied constitutional authority.”); id. at 1506 (“Although judicial integrity and
separation-of-power principles are important considerations in formulating an appropriate
remedy for a violation of federal law, they provide no independent source of authority for
the exercise of supervisory power when there has been no violation of any constitutional
provision or federal statute. The federal courts’ authority to create federal common law may
provide an additional basis for some supervisory power decisions, but it cannot be expanded
to control matters left by the Constitution either to the states or to a coordinate federal
branch.”).
144. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000).
145. See, e.g., Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 352-53 (1959).
146. See Beale, supra note 140, at 1509, 1515-16, 1521.
147. See McNabb, 318 U.S. at 345-46; Beale, supra note 140, at 1507.
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The consequence is that responsibility for adopting the Standards or any of
its measures will fall inevitably and ultimately to the political branches.
Because the Standards rely on the political branches for their adoption,
they are dependent upon the political will of legislators and executives to
act on their own initiatives without any threat of court intervention that
would accompany a claim of constitutional necessity. In the present
environment, at least, it is hard to see whence that initiative would come.
Supporters might draw some hope from prior legislative efforts to regulate
law enforcement access to information held by third parties. For example,
they might point to the Penn Register Act,148 which was passed in the wake
of Smith vs. Maryland,149 or the Video Privacy Protection Act,150 passed in
response to disclosures of Robert Bork’s video rental history after he was
nominated by Ronald Reagan to a position on the Supreme Court.151 It is
surely true that these laws provide constitutionally gratuitous protections,
and therefore demonstrate the potential for recruiting political will
sufficient to limit the third party doctrine in specific cases. To extrapolate
from these specific examples more general support for the broader
regulations proposed by the Standards would, however, be akin to the
fallacy of generalizing from the particular. Far more likely are piecemeal
initiatives such as recent efforts led by Senator Patrick Leahy to amend the
Stored Communications Act to reflect changes in expansion of online
storage of electronic mail.152 But, given the glacial progress of this narrow,
and relatively uncontroversial measure, this looks more like an exception
that proves the rule of legislative inaction rather than an example of
political will building around a broader, more expansive set of regulations
on the scale of the Standards.
148. Pen/Trap Statute (Pen Register Act), Pub. L. No. 99-508, Title III, § 301(a), 100
Stat. 1848, 1868.
149. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
150. Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 3195 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012)).
151. S. REP. NO. 100-599, at 5 (1988). One might add to this list other components of the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, including the Wiretap Act and the Stored
Communications Act, but that would be a mistake. Both of these provisions trace directly to
the threat of constitutional regulation posed by Katz and its progeny. That the SCA limited
its extension of warrant protection to electronic communications stored for fewer than 180
days proves the point. In 1986, when the law was passed, that line described what
legislators imagined to be the outlying boundary for how long service providers could
physically and economically store communications committed to their custody for purposes
of transport.
152. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2013, S. 607, 113th
Cong. (2013).
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To see clear evidence of the lack of political will that is available to
advance broad and general regulations along the lines described by the
Standards, we need look no further than the remarkable absence of coherent
public outcry in the wake of recent revelations about broad, pervasive, and
indiscriminate surveillance efforts. Take, for example, New York’s
Domain Awareness System. When confronted with comparisons of the
technology to the dystopian surveillance state described by George Orwell
in 1984, Mayor Bloomberg boasted that the NYPD was no longer a “mom
and pop police department.”153 In the intervening months there have been
no serious public or legislative efforts to challenge either the technology or
its implementation. Public docility in the face of revelations that the NSA,
FBI, and CIA are engaged in policies of broad and indiscriminate searches,
such as the telephony metadata program,154 and surreptitious infiltration of
networks owned and operated by major internet companies, provides yet
more evidence that there is insufficient political will to compel serious
regulation.155
This is not to suggest that there has been no pushback. There are a few
legislators who have taken to the floor of their respective chambers to
condemn the executive agencies involved and the lack of substantive court
oversight.156 Several internet companies have also offered strident public
critiques.157 Others have made it corporate policy to fight back. For
example, Twitter has committed itself to protecting user information to any
153. Rocco Parascandola & Tina Moore, NYPD Unveils New $40 Million Super
Computer System That Uses Data from Network of Cameras, License Plate Readers, and
Crime Reports, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 8, 2012, http://www.nydailynews.com/newyork/nypd-unveils-new-40-million-super-computer-system-data-network-cameras-license-platereaders-crime-reports-article-1.1132135.
154. See, e.g., Roberts & Ackerman, supra note 6.
155. On this front, at least, there may be some movement. As this essay goes to press,
the House of Representatives passed the USA FREEDOM Act, H.R. 3361, 113th Cong.
(2014) (as passed by House, May 22, 2014), which would amend the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act to change the process by which the FBI and NSA would gain access to
business records, including telephonic metadata. The text of the bill can be found at H.R.
3361 – USA FREEDOM Act, CONGRESS.GOV, http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/
house-bill/3361 (last visited May 27, 2014).
156. Ashley Parker, Republicans, Led by Rand Paul, Finally End Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 6, 2013), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/06/rand-paul-does-not-go-quietlyinto-the-night/?ref=politics.
157. Gellman & Soltani, supra note 12 (quoting David Drummond, Chief Legal Officer
at Google, as stating, “We are outraged at the lengths to which the government seems to
have gone to intercept data from our private fiber networks, and it underscores the need for
urgent reform”).
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extent it can, including efforts to quash subpoenas and other requests for
user information.158 Some companies have also made it a practice to
publish the number of subpoenas they have received and to which they have
responded.159 Most recently, Google and its employees have reacted with
outrage and profanity to news that their secure networks were penetrated by
the NSA, allowing the government broad access to the contents of customer
communications and the cloud storage facilities where user content is
stored.160 None of this reaction has matured into action, however—and it is
hard to imagine that it ever will. That is because there is a 500-pound
gorilla in the room, which has time and again proved capable of crushing
any serious efforts to secure privacy against government dataveillance:
national security.
The LEATPR Standards specifically decline to address governments’
accessing third party records for the purposes of national security.161 This
omission dooms the Standards’ prospects for two reasons. First, the
Standards simply cannot hope to generate any political will for their own
adoption in the face of countervailing complaints that such procedures as
the Standards describe would compromise national security. Attempting to
carve off national security investigations just makes matters worse by
adding validity to irrationally overblown claims of existential threats that
158. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 949 N.Y.S. 2d 590 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012).
159. See, e.g., Transparency Report, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/
userdatarequests/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2014).
160. Google Employees on NSA: ‘F*ck These Guys’, HUFFINGTON POST, Nov. 6, 2013,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/06/google-nsa_n_4227596.html; Google Statement on
NSA Infiltration of Links Between Data Centers, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2013, http://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/world/national-security/google-statement-on-nsa-infiltration-of-links-betweendata-centers/2013/10/30/75f3314a-41b3-11e3-a624-41d661b0bb78_story.html.
161. STANDARD 25-2.1(a). There is a chance that some of the concerns that follow are
mooted by the Standards’ definition of “national security acquisitions” as “those intended to
acquire information concerning a foreign power or an agent thereof.” STANDARD 25-2.1(a)
commentary. For example, taken literally, this definition of “national security” would
exclude investigations of terrorism, border security, and the NSA’s telephonic dataveillance
program because none of these necessarily involves a “foreign power” or its agents. The
Standards themselves do not suggest this narrow, literal reading, however. That is evident in
the commentaries, which contemplate information gathering that might have prevented the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as outside the scope of the Standards. Id. Footnote
14 in the introduction is even more explicit, appearing to embrace the broader definition of
“national security” set forth in the USA PATRIOT Act, and explicitly encompassing
“telephone records of a person who is not an agent of a foreign power, so long as those
records are relevant to a national security investigation of such an agent.” LEATPR
STANDARDS, supra note 58, at 5 n.14.
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have been used to grant largely unchecked license for law enforcement to
engage in all sorts of invasive surveillance and dataveillance. Second, even
if the Standards were to provide sufficient reassurance to nervous
legislators that national security would in no way be compromised by
implementing significant access controls in the context of criminal
investigations, the exception represented by the carve-out would swallow
the rule.
There can be no doubt that the primary use and abuse of the third party
doctrine these days is in the national security arena. From New York’s
Domain Awareness System to the NSA’s gathering of all telephonic
metadata generated by every call serviced by every telephone company in
the United States, the primary justification officials cite is national security
and the war on terror. But these examples are little more than pebbles cast
into still waters. Rippling outward from this center are hundreds and
thousands of federal agencies, state law enforcement, and local police
departments that have been recruited into the ever-sprawling project of
national security. Every one of these agencies and agents is now deployed
in the war on terror.
For example, by rhetoric and bureaucratic design, immigration
enforcement is now a centerpiece of national security policy. Moreover,
local law enforcement is now heavily involved through federal programs
such as 529(g) and Secure Communities, which have successfully made
immigration enforcement a primary law enforcement concern at every
level—right down to local beat cops.162 Even the previously secular war on
drugs has now got national security religion. Some of this coming to the
faith is understandable—the opiate trade traces straight back to terrorist
centers in Afghanistan and Pakistan, after all163—but, with drug cartels and
other organizations tied to cocaine and marijuana production in south and
central America now designated “terrorist organizations” by the State
Department,164 every local narcotics enforcement agency is engaged in
national security activities. If even the most quotidian of police actions—
traffic stops and drug investigations—can now be linked to national
security, then the Standards look like the saddest damsel at the dance.
None of this is a surprise. During the founding era, when anti-federalists
attacked the Constitution and the central government it contemplated as a
162. Gray, Cooper, & McAloon, supra note 113, at 26-32.
163. See GRETCHEN PETERS, HOW OPIUM PROFITS THE TALIBAN 3-6 (2009), available at
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/resources/taliban_opium_1.pdf.
164. Foreign Terrorist Organizations, STATE.GOV (Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.state.gov/
j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.
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threat to individual liberty, critics knew the power of executive claims of
emergency to justify invasive search and seizure. Consider, for example,
the prophetic words of the Maryland Farmer, who wrote in 1788 about the
inability of common law prohibitions on general warrants to resist
executive overreaching in “cases which may strongly interest the passions
of government.”165 His concerns were well grounded not only in the
American experience with writs of assistance, but also in British
experiences with general warrants used to target political and religious
subversives. Reflecting on perhaps the most famous of these cases, Wilkes
v. Wood,166 the Canadian Freeholder noted that executive officers are too
“fond of doctrines of reason of state, and state necessity, and the
impossibility of providing for great emergencies and extraordinary cases,”
and that they therefore demanded “discretionary power in the Crown to
proceed sometimes by uncommon methods not agreeable to the known
forms of law.”167 What was true for our eighteenth century forebears is true
for us today—and the same lesson applies: it is simply folly to hope that
political will or self-restraint will be enough to keep government agents
within the compass of powers proscribed for them by the liberty of their
subjects.
Our forefathers understood that this goal can only be
accomplished by enforcement of constitutional precommitments.168 There
165. A MARYLAND FARMER, NO. 1 (1788), reprinted in THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION
462, 464 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner, eds. 1987) (“[S]uppose for instance, that an
officer of the United States should force the house, the asylum of a citizen, by virtue of a
general warrant, I would ask, are general warrants illegal by the constitution of the United
States? Would a court, or even a jury, but juries are no longer to exist, punish a man who
acted by express authority, upon the bare recollection of what once was law and right? I fear
not, especially in those cases which may strongly interest the passions of government, and in
such only have general warrants been used.”).
166. (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (C.P.).
167. 2 THE CANADIAN FREEHOLDER: IN THREE DIALOGUES BETWEEN AN ENGLISHMAN
AND A FRENCHMAN SETTLED IN CANADA 243-44 (London, B. White 1779).
168. As Thomas Davies has shown, the Fourth Amendment was adopted as a
constitutional Precommitment against not only executive overreach but legislative license as
well. See Davies, supra note 99, at 578-81, 657-60, 663-64, 668. Specifically, although
general warrants were prohibited under the common law well before 1791, anti-federalists
were concerned that the federal government might be tempted to pass legislation licensing
general warrants, particularly if faced with a claim of emergency or necessity. Id. at 668
(“[The framers] thought the important issue, and the only potential threat to the right to be
secure, was whether general warrants could be authorized by legislation.”). Recent
amendments to the USA PATRIOT Act that have been exploited, with legislative
acquiescence and approval, to allow the NSA to pursue broadening dataveillance programs
under the auspices of general warrants issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss4/8

2014]

ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY RECORDS

949

is no reason to think that the project of reform and regulation described by
the Standards can escape this historically proven truth.169
V. Some Concerns with the Core Approach
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Jones,
and recent revelations about widespread and largely unchecked government
surveillance and dataveillance, advocates, activists, technologists, and
scholars have advanced a range of possible approaches to the challenge of
preserving privacy in the twenty-first century. Although diverse in the
details, most of these proposals fall into one of four categories.
The first is market-based and favors allowing the private sector to
develop business models and technologies capable of protecting personal
information.170 The problem with these proposals, of course, is that they
perpetuate an arms race between government and corporate engineers.
Moreover, even when the corporate guardians win, they are still vulnerable
to overt demands for information, which few have so far been able to
resist.171 As a consequence, pure market-based solutions seem to be
doomed to failure without some kind of legislative or constitutional
framework that can constrain government surveillance and limit legal
access to third party records.
The second strategy focuses on the duration of a search or the quantity of
information that is discovered or aggregated. In his concurring opinion in
Jones, Justice Alito seemed to favor just this sort of approach.172
Christopher Slobogin has picked up that mantle by elaborating model
provide a modern vision of our founders’ bête noir. See Gray & Citron, supra note 18, at
119-23.
169. A similar case can be made based on the Standards’ decision not to regulate grand
jury investigations. See STANDARD 25-2.1(c). As I have argued elsewhere, the grand jury
exception to the exclusionary rule has left largely unregulated a widening range of law
enforcement-citizen engagements to the detriment of Fourth Amendment rights. See Gray,
Cooper, & McAloon, supra note 113, at 21-25.
170. See, e.g., DISCONNECT, https://Disconnect.me (last visited Apr. 11, 2014).
171. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. Yahoo reports rejecting only 8% of
requests for user data from U.S. law enforcement agencies between July 1, 2013, and
December 31, 2013. Transparency Report: Government Data Requests, YAHOO,
https://transparency.yahoo.com/government-data-requests/US-JUL-DEC-2013.html
(last
visited May 13, 2014). Google reports providing data in response to 83% of requests in the
same time frame. Transparency Report: Requests for User Information, GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/countries/https://www.google.
com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/countries/ (last visited May 13, 2014).
172. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962-63 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
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legislation that would set boundaries on how long law enforcement officers
can conduct surveillance and how much data they can aggregate.173
Although far more promising than pure market-based approaches, proposals
based on the duration of surveillance or raw quantity of data gathered
inevitably will be under- and over-inclusive.174 Professor Slobogin has
acknowledged these difficulties, and his proposed statute does its best to
address them by striking reasonable bright lines,175 but even these efforts
cannot avoid this inherent deficit of all purely quantitative approaches to
regulating surveillance and data gathering.
A third strategy would focus regulatory attention on the technologies that
are used to facilitate surveillance and dataveillance. Danielle Citron and I
have argued for this strategy in a sustained way through a series of recent
articles.176 As we point out in this work, the Fourth Amendment was
conceived and designed as a bulwark against the temptations that
legislatures and executives inevitably feel to derogate from the common
law prohibition on general warrants.177 Our founders knew from their own
experiences with writs of assistance that granting government agents broad
powers to search anyone, anywhere, at any time, leaves all citizens insecure
in their persons, homes, papers, and effects.178 The Fourth Amendment
guarantees a right to security by limiting the government’s search powers
within the compass of reasonableness. In our view, technologies that are
capable of facilitating policies of broad and indiscriminate search pose the
same threat to general security that general warrants did in the eighteenth
century.179 We therefore argue that law enforcement access to these
technologies must be limited in order to effect a reasonable balance
between government interests in preventing, detecting, and prosecuting
crime and citizens’ interests in security from pervasive surveillance.180 As
we point out, striking that balance will depend on the nature of the

173. Slobogin, supra note 92, at 16-37.
174. See David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls
and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH.
381, 427 (2013).
175. Slobogin, supra note 92, at 16-37.
176. See, e.g., Citron & Gray, supra note 98; Gray & Citron, supra note 174; Gray &
Citron, supra note 18; Gray, Citron & Rinehart, supra note 39.
177. Gray & Citron, supra note 18, at 92-100.
178. Id. at 70, 93-96.
179. Id. at 101-05.
180. Id. at 101-03.
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technology in question and the competing interests at stake.181 Sometimes
warrants may be required.182 For other technologies, administrative review
subject to court oversight may suffice.183 What the Fourth Amendment
cannot abide, however, are efforts to revitalize general warrants such as
those issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in support of
the NSA’s telephony metadata gathering program.184
The fourth major category of proposals focuses on the nature and
significance of the information that is sought or secured. Neil Richards has
perhaps done the most to advance this strategy on the academic side
through a series of articles driven by First Amendment rather than Fourth
Amendment concerns.185 The LEATPR Standards also adopt this tack.
Danielle Citron and I have argued elsewhere against this content-based
approach on conceptual and practical grounds.186 Although the Standards
provide a distinct and much more specific set of proposals than has been
previously offered, they suffer the same conceptual and practical deficits
and are therefore vulnerable to the same objections. Before getting to those
concerns, however, it is important to take notice of a failure that is unique
to the Standards and is measured by its own metrics for progress.
The Standards fail to advance the cause of privacy even according to
their own internally defined metric. “Privacy” for purposes of the
Standards, is defined as the “ability to control what information about
oneself is known to others and for what purposes that information is
used.”187 The third party doctrine holds that, as a constitutional matter,
there is only one way to control information and, in turn, only one way to
control the purposes for which information is used: keep it secret. In her
concurring opinion in Jones, Justice Sotomayor suggests that this conflation
of secrecy and privacy is no longer tenable in the age of Big Data and
ubiquitous surveillance,188 and that we must therefore “reconsider” the third
181. Id. at 105-24 (discussing the Fourth Amendment status of drones, data aggregation
technology, and human surveillance under a technology-centered approach to quantitative
privacy).
182. Id. at 105-12 (arguing for a warrant requirement covering discrete surveillance
technologies like drones).
183. Id. at 112-24 (arguing for administrative review structures modeled on consent
decrees to cover data aggregation technologies).
184. Id. at 119.
185. See, e.g., Richards, Intellectual Privacy, supra note 97.
186. Citron & Gray, supra note 98.
187. STANDARD 25-4.1(a) commentary.
188. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I
for one doubt that people would accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the
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party doctrine.189 Without purporting to disrupt constitutional doctrine,190
the Standards take a similar view of the relationship between secrecy and
privacy. “[P]rivacy is not secrecy,” we are told.191 Rather, “secrecy is
merely one form of privacy.”192 Thus, although it is true to the point of
tautology that keeping information about oneself secret will serve to keep
that information private as well, the Standards seek more bespoke measures
that will allow us to share personal information while still preserving some
level of control over the use and dissemination of that information.
Unfortunately, the Standards fail in that effort. To see why, it is necessary
to examine the regulatory strategy that the Standards adopt.
The Standards’ strategy for offering greater privacy controls without
requiring secrecy is organized around two overlapping spectrums. The first
spectrum measures the privacy interests that individuals might hold in
information they share with third parties. Some information is “highly
private,” some is “moderately private,” some is “minimally private,” and
some is “not private” at all.193 The second spectrum describes four ways
that law enforcement might gain access to information held by third parties
without the consent194 of the person whose privacy interests are at stake: by
Government of a list of every Web site they had visited in the last week, or month, or year.
But whatever the societal expectations, they can attain constitutionally protected status only
if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for
privacy.”).
189. Id.
190. LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 58, at 6-9.
191. STANDARD 25-4.1(a) commentary.
192. Id.
193. STANDARD 25-4.2.
194. Consent gets separate treatment under the Standards:
Law enforcement should be permitted to access by particularized request
any record maintained by an institutional third party if:
(a) the focus of the record has knowingly and voluntarily consented to that
specific law enforcement access;
(b) the focus of the record has knowingly and voluntarily given generalized
consent to law enforcement access, and
(i) the information in the record is unprotected or minimally protected;
(ii) it was possible to decline the generalized consent and still obtain the
desired service from the provider requesting consent, and the focus of the
record had specifically acknowledged that it was possible; or
(iii) a legislature has decided that in a particular context, such as certain
government contracting, generalized consent should suffice for the information
contained in the record; or
(c) the record pertains to a joint account and any one joint account holder
has given consent as provided in subdivision (a) or (b).
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court order195 based on a judicial determination of probable cause,196 by
court order based on a judicial determination of reasonable suspicion or a
finding of investigative need,197 by prosecutorial subpoena,198 or by an
official certification of a politically accountable official within a law
enforcement agency.199 Symmetry dictates what follows: in order for law
enforcement to demand access to records held by third parties that contain
highly private information, a court order based on a judicial finding of
probable cause is required;200 records containing moderately private
information require a court order based on reasonable suspicion or a finding
of investigative need;201 access to records containing minimally protected
information requires a subpoena;202 and information that is not private at all
requires only an official certification.203
There is no doubt that the framework proposed by the Standards marks
an improvement over current practices operating under the third party
doctrine. Foremost, the Standards recognize that sharing information does
not, or at least should not, entail a complete abdication of all expectations
of privacy.204 Unfortunately, that is all that is offered. The Standards do
not challenge in any fundamental way the structured assumptions about the

STANDARD 25-5.1.
195. The Standards describe a “court order” as:
(i) a judicial determination that there is probable cause to believe the
information in the record contains or will lead to evidence of crime;
(ii) a judicial determination that there is reasonable suspicion to believe the
information in the record contains or will lead to evidence of crime;
(iii) a judicial determination that the record is relevant to an investigation;
or
(iv) a prosecutorial certification that the record is relevant to an
investigation.
STANDARD 25-5.2(a).
196. STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(i).
197. See STANDARD 25-5.2(a)(ii)-(iv).
198. STANDARD 25-5.2(b) (requiring that subpoenas be “based upon a prosecutorial or
agency determination that the record is relevant to an investigation”).
199. STANDARD 25.52(c) (requiring that official certifications be “based upon a written
determination by a politically accountable official that there is a reasonable possibility that
the record is relevant to initiating or pursuing an investigation”).
200. STANDARD 25-5.3(a)(i).
201. STANDARD 25-5.3(a)(ii).
202. STANDARD 25-5.3(a)(iii).
203. STANDARD 25-5.3(d) (“Law enforcement should be permitted to access unprotected
information for any legitimate law enforcement purpose.”).
204. See STANDARD 25-3.3 commentary.
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nature of privacy and its relationship to secrecy that underlie the third party
doctrine. This general approach is both problematic and worrisome.
Although often condensed as “the premise that an individual has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to
third parties,”205 the third party doctrine is not so broad. Were it so, then
there would be no constitutional barrier against wiretapping or any other
interception of communications because all information imparted during a
conversation is by definition “disclosed to third parties.” Rather, the third
party doctrine holds that the Fourth Amendment is not violated if the
government obtains through lawful means information from a third party
that an investigative target voluntarily shared with that third party.206 Put
differently, sharing information with a third party entails an assumption of
risk that the third party might share that information with others, either
voluntarily or if compelled to do so by “legal process.” 207
As the LEATPR Standards rightly recognize, this “assumption of risk”
model of privacy conflates privacy and secrecy. The Standards are deeply
critical of the third party doctrine on this score. “Privacy,” according to the
Standards, is more expansive than secrecy. It “is the more encompassing
ability to control what information about oneself is known to others, and for
what purposes that information is used.”208 Secrecy is certainly one method
of preserving privacy, but it is not, and should not be, the only way. After
all, it makes very little sense to talk about “control” if the only options are
to quit, abdicate, withdraw, or simply not participate in the first place.209
To draw the inevitable sports analogy, we certainly would not say that a
basketball player has excellent ball control when all he does is hold the ball,
never dribbling, passing, or shooting.
Rather, “control” implies
engagement, and describes the ability to restrain, direct, and influence the
course and outcome of events once one has engaged. To the extent that

205. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,
443 (1976)).
206. See Miller, 425 U.S. at 442-43; Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
207. Smith, 442 U.S. at 744 (finding that a person who uses the phone “assume[s] the risk
that the [telephone] company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed”).
208. STANDARD 25-4.1(a) commentary.
209. DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE 3.0: A CIVIL RIGHTS AGENDA TO COMBAT
DISCRIMINATORY ONLINE HARASSMENT (forthcoming 2014) (on file with author) (arguing at
length against the proposition that those who are subjected to online harassment should just
stay off the internet); Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 105
(2009) (same).
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privacy is a function of control, then, the Standards are perfectly right to
hold that privacy is more than secrecy.
Given the Standards’ critique of the third party doctrine’s conflation of
secrecy and privacy, one would expect some effort by the Standards to
provide means short of secrecy by which one could exercise control over
personal information. Unfortunately, they do not. To the contrary, they
reinforce the basic digital dynamic that underlies the third party doctrine:
keep it secret, and preserve your privacy, or share, and run the risk that
what you share will end up in the hands of law enforcement through lawful
means. It is certainly true that the Standards add dimension and specificity
to the otherwise abstract notion of “lawful means,” but doing so provides
no additional measures by which a person might exercise control over the
use and dissemination of personal information. Under the Standards, as
under the status quo described by the third party doctrine, secrecy is the
only game in town.
To see the point, consider the two spectrums at the core of the Standards.
The first spectrum describes a range of privacy interests one might have in
a particular bit of information extending from “highly private” to “not
private.”210 Given the Standards’ focus on control, one would expect to
have a high degree of control over highly private information and very little
control over information that is not private. The Standards provide no such
means of control, however. Rather, the second spectrum describes a range
of comparatively higher procedural hurdles for law enforcement to clear
when seeking access to information.211 Nothing about the process of
clearing those hurdles suggests any control by the subject. It certainly does
not provide for any additional tools that a person might use to limit the use
and dissemination of private information. Rather, it seems that we are still
caught in a world where secrecy is the only means available for someone
who wants to preserve her privacy.
A defender of the Standards might respond to this point by shifting the
conversation away from “control” in its colloquial sense to a more technical
account that focuses on risk assessment. On this view, the fundamental
question is that which was initiated by the Court in Katz: reasonable
expectations of privacy. What the Standards really provide, then, is a more
elaborate and specific risk profile that citizens can use when weighing
whether to break the seal of secrecy by sharing personal information. Thus,
we might reasonably expect that “highly protected” information is less
210. See STANDARD 25-4.1.
211. STANDARD 25-4.2.
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likely to be shared with the government than “minimally protected”
information. In a somewhat paradoxical sense, then, one need be less
cautious in sharing “highly protected” information, but might well need to
keep completely secret anything that warrants only “minimal protection.”
Unfortunately, this response does nothing more than admit defeat
according to the Standards’ own, well, standards. Remember that “privacy”
according to the Standards is about control, not prediction. As it stands, we
all know that our telephone calls are being monitored for metadata and that
the contents of our communications and data files transmitted through or
held by Google are accessible by the NSA. It would tax the language,
however, to claim that this knowledge is what we mean by “privacy,” much
less “control.” To the contrary, if “privacy” is a function of control, then
knowledge that one has no control means that one has no privacy.
Nothing changes if one can predict that information will only be
accessible by provision of a judicial warrant. All that does is specify the
process that law enforcement must go through to gain access to personal
information. It does not inform the citizen of how likely that eventuality is.
Neither do the LEATPR Standards suggest other means by which a citizen
could negotiate, impose, or enforce any sort of constraints on the sharing of
information, even if governed by a warrant process. Thus, shifting the
ground from control to prediction simply highlights the fact that the
Standards really do not offer any additional means to protect privacy by
effecting “control [over] what information about oneself is known to others,
and for what purposes that information is used.”212 The Standards instead
put us back where we started: a practical, if not conceptual, collapsing of
privacy into secrecy. Under the Standards, as under the status quo, once
information is shared, it is out of your control.
The Standards’ failure to expand subjects’ control over the use and
dissemination of private information beyond the nuclear option of secrecy
is further reflected in the procedures law enforcement can use to access
private information. Just as under the status quo, law enforcement’s
pathway to third party records under the regime described by the Standards
is ex parte. That means that the holders of privacy interests, who have both
the purest need and the dearest desire to exercise control over access to
third party records, will continue to be denied the opportunity to participate
in the adversarial processes where their interests are assessed and either
protected or compromised. The Standards do impose certain notice

212. STANDARD 25-4.1(a) commentary.
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requirements,213 but these offer no real solace. That is because the notice
contemplated is post hoc. So, once notice is received, the moment to
exercise control has already passed.
Perhaps the Standards’ most blinding failure to offer real control over
information is found in the decision to give legislatures and courts sole
authority to designate the level of privacy that will be afforded to
information. It is hard to imagine a more profound denial of control over
information than allowing someone else to decide how “private” one’s
private information is. That the decision is a generic one does not change
anything, and may well make matters worse. That is because it emphasizes
further the lack of real control that each of us has over our information. Not
only is the degree of privacy interest not your decision, but the Standards
will not even consider your unique claims or circumstances.214
Furthermore, the general approach to assessing privacy interests submits
this most critical decision to a political process. The inevitable result will
be endless contests over which kinds of information deserve which level of
protection.215 Marking the boundaries between information that is highly
private and only moderately private presents practical problems, of course,
but more worrisome is the inevitable politicization of the process and its
outputs.
By definition, decision makers designated by the Standards to categorize
personal information will have to pick winners and losers among different
persons and groups and among their competing conceptions of the good
life.216 That process will almost inevitably lead to decisions that further
marginalize and oppress minorities and those who hold minority views.217
All the more so given the outsized influence that national security interests
are bound to have.218 It is one thing to be told that government agents need
access to the information you regard as most private in order to effectuate
213. STANDARD 25-5.7.
214. See LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 58, at 12 (“It should be stressed that this
determination will have been made by a legislature, administrative agency, or court” before
law enforcement officers seek access.).
215. Cf. Orin Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV.
311, 330-53 (2012) (leveling this argument against the “mosaic theory” of quantitative
privacy). For a critical discussion of Kerr’s concerns, see Gray & Citron, supra note 174, at
422-28. The Standards foresee these debates, see STANDARD 25-4.1 commentary, but fail to
address the oppressive potential of the contests and the decisions.
216. Citron & Gray, supra note 98, at 267-68.
217. Id.
218. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 19, at 1479-80 (exploring the Schmittian “state of
emergency” exceptionalism embraced in the post-9/11 era).
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the war on terror. It is quite another, however, to be told that the
information is not private at all because, were it otherwise, it would be too
difficult for law enforcement to obtain regular access.
The Standards appear to foresee this objection. Specifically, the
commentary to Standard 25-4.1 emphasizes that the assignment of privacy
interest must come first and be considered separately from the level of
privacy protection.219 In order to ensure that sequence, Standard 25-4.2(b)
provides a safety valve of sorts for law enforcement, which would allow a
legislature to lower the hurdles for accessing highly private information.
There is no structural way to enforce this sequence, of course.220
Furthermore, a quick look at the political costs of assigning relatively lower
degrees of privacy interest to information versus granting law enforcement
a broad exception suggests that passive aggression is the more likely
course. Even where the Standards’ preferred sequence is followed, the
“out” offered by 25-4.2(b) seems like an exception that is very likely to
swallow the rule given the outsized role played by national security
interests in the current environment. We need look no further than the
general warrant issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court for
the NSA’s telephonic surveillance program to see both the pressures and
the effects.221
Supporters of the Standards might try another response, arguing that the
four factors offered as relevant for assessing the privacy interests held in
third party records will provide sufficient breadth and constraint to meet, or
at least mostly moot, these concerns.222 Of course, that does nothing more
than move the debate, and therefore the site of oppression, back one step.
Moreover, the factors themselves seem to create more space for controversy
and potential oppression than they provide guidance, predictability, or
control. Let us take a moment to consider each of them in turn.
The first factor that legislatures, administrative agencies, or courts are
tasked to consider when weighing the level of privacy interest held in
information contained in third party records, is whether “the initial transfer
of such information to an institutional third party is reasonably necessary to
participate meaningfully in society or in commerce, or is socially beneficial,
219. STANDARD 25-4.1 commentary.
220. STANDARD 25-4.2(b) (allowing legislatures to alter the scheme if it “would render
law enforcement unable to solve or prevent an unacceptable amount of otherwise solvable or
preventable crime”).
221. See In re Application of F.B.I. for an Order Requiring Prod. of Tangible Things
from [Redacted], No. BR 13-80 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. Apr. 25, 2013).
222. See STANDARD 25-4.1.
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including to freedom of speech and association.”223 The main problems
with this factor are, of course, that it is utterly ambiguous and requires the
very selection among competing ethical views that Danielle Citron and I
have warned against. Let us consider first the ambiguity.
Viewed one way, the first factor might cut in favor of assigning a higher
privacy interest to information that comes under its wing. After all, if the
information is forced out by necessity rather than freely shared, then it
would seem wrong to penalize the privacy holder for simply participating in
the world.224 On the other hand, a functional requirement that information
be shared in order to facilitate routine daily life may reflect a social
discount such that it is no longer reasonable to preserve a strong privacy
interest in that information. In short, the need to share may tell us very
little about the privacy interests. We may be required to share very personal
information, as when we tell our physicians about the uncomfortable rash
we’ve developed “down there.” Alternatively, we may be required to
reveal information that is utterly banal, such as sharing preferences on
brands of sneakers with an online vendor when searching their inventory.
So, the fact that I am required to share information really says nothing
about the implications of revelation for my privacy interests.225
The more compelling problem with the first factor is, however, that it
requires legislatures, administrative agencies, or courts to select among
competing conceptions of the good life. Neutrality as to ethical choice is a
cornerstone of liberal democracies and is baked into the American
consciousness.226 Citizens of equal standing who have different views on
what, for them, constitutes the pursuit of happiness inevitably will have
different views on what sort of information must be easily accessible in
order to facilitate the social good and what must be protected as private in
order to secure sufficient space for projects of ethical self-development.
It is out of this respect for diversity of views on the nature and value of
privacy that the Supreme Court has declined to make the kinds of
assessments that the Standards demand. In Kyllo v. United States, the Court
223. STANDARD 25-4.1(a).
224. See Citron, supra note 209, at 104-05.
225. At most, it operates as a limitation on the quasi-abandonment rationale of the third
party doctrine. So, the first factor shows that any assertion that sharing implies lack of
privacy is false; but it does not show either that sharing requirements signal a diminishment
of privacy interest or that sharing requirements indicate heightened privacy interests.
226. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness.”).
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had the opportunity to link Fourth Amendment protections to the degree of
intimacy entailed in the information gathered by law enforcement when
using a heat detection device to peer into a home.227 Writing for the Court,
Justice Scalia declined this invitation because he thought the Court had
neither the qualifications nor the authority to determine what is and is not
“intimate.”228 Laying ground for the technology-centered approach that
Danielle Citron and I have defended, Justice Scalia focused instead on the
invasiveness of the technology itself and its potential to render a wide range
of activities subject to government surveillance, whether “intimate” or
not.229
The Standards, of course, go in precisely the opposite direction. Rather
than preserving neutrality as to competing conceptions of intimacy, privacy,
expression, and social benefit, they specifically charge legislatures,
administrative agencies, and courts with the task of choosing among them.
Elsewhere, Danielle Citron and I have warned about the dangers that inhere
to these sorts of political contests, particularly for political and social
outsiders, who more often than not make outsized contributions to society
in the long term.230 The fact that the Standards give specific license to
challenge and perhaps violate this basic democratic commitment to
neutrality should give us pause.
The second factor is neither more helpful nor less subject to contest.
Here the Standards require that legislatures, agencies, and courts consider
whether the information disclosed is “intimate and likely to cause
embarrassment or stigma if disclosed, and whether outside of the initial
transfer to an institutional third party it is typically disclosed only within
one’s close social network, if at all.”231 These are, of course, highly
personal assessments. Some of us—this author included—tend to be very
private people. We (I) would never share the sorts of information that
others broadcast freely over blogs or social networking websites. Where
this is the case, a legislative, administrative, or court decision to go with
what seems to be the public practice would by definition deny protection to
those of us who are less visible precisely because we value our privacy.
The third factor offered by the Standards to decision makers tasked to
assess the privacy interests invested in particular kinds of information does
little to add new opportunities for control or to temper threats posed by
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

See 533 U.S. 27, 37-38 (2001).
Id.
Id.; see also Gray & Citron, supra note 18, at 105, 127-28.
Citron & Gray, supra note 98, at 267-68.
STANDARD 25-4.1(b).
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submitting these questions to a political process. Here, the Standards ask
whether the information at issue “is accessible to and accessed by nongovernment persons outside the institutional third party.”232 Here again, no
additional opportunities to effect control appear to be offered. Save the odd
opportunity to decline a request from vendors to share our information with
their commercial partners, we seldom have control over what institutional
third parties do with the information we provide to them. Their contracts
for services, including their privacy policies, are almost always contracts of
adhesion. Moreover, even when we may be willing participants in
information sharing among third parties, our reasons for being so are
unlikely to translate directly into a lessened expectation of privacy with
respect to sharing with law enforcement. For example, I might be quite
happy about the potential for information-sharing among health providers
because it can advance the cause of providing me with more consistent and
cost-effective care. It does not follow, however, that this information is
anything less than “highly private.”
The fourth factor appears to hold a bit more promise, but also raises
some confusion. Here the Standards suggest that whether “existing law,
including the law of privilege, restricts or allows access to and
dissemination of such information or of comparable information” is
relevant to assessing the level of privacy interest invested in that
information.233 Although the promise of using collateral legislative efforts
to effectuate constraints on law enforcement access is intriguing, the current
landscape of such laws raises some eyebrows. For example, access to video
rental records is restricted by law,234 but access to location information is
not. The Standards’ reference to the laws of privilege is also a bit
confusing. Privilege addresses the party with whom information is shared,
not what information is shared235—and it is the information that is of
concern to the Standards. Moreover, privilege covers a pretty wide range of
information. Some privileged relationships are centered on a fairly narrow
range of types of information. Patient-doctor relationships are a good
example. But others are not nearly so limited. Take for example the range
of information shared with lawyers, priests, and spouses. It is so broad that

232. STANDARD 25-4.1(c).
233. STANDARD 25-4.1(d).
234. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012).
235. See, e.g., 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2502(B) (2011) (“A client has a privilege to refuse to
disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made
for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services . . . .”).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014

962

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:919

this fourth factor seems at risk of being overinclusive to the point of
negation.
For these and other reasons, Danielle Citron and I have argued elsewhere
that efforts to protect privacy in the face of twenty-first century threats
should focus on regulating law enforcement’s access to and use of
surveillance and dataveillance technologies.236 In our view, what is
troubling about the dataveillance technologies that take advantage of the
third party doctrine is not what information they gather, but, rather, the
broad, indiscriminate, and continuous nature of the surveillance they
facilitate, and the effects of that surveillance on general security in our
persons, houses, papers, and effects.237 If we want to preserve reasonable
expectations of privacy against these technologies, then we should confront
the threats that they pose directly. The Standards choose a collateral
approach. For that reason, and for others set forth here, they are unlikely to
succeed.
VI. Conclusion
There is, of course, much more to say and write about the LEATPR
Standards.
They reflect both serious thinking and, perhaps more
importantly, serious engagement among representatives of the many
constituencies that are concerned with the current state of affairs with
respect to law enforcement access to third party records. Even though this
essay is ultimately skeptical of the Standards on their own terms and on
exogenous grounds, the merit of the enterprise and the value of the product
cannot be denied and should not be dismissed. The Standards truly
represent a Herculean effort. There is no doubt that they will serve as a
valuable source of ideas and locus for important conversations going
forward. I, for one, am grateful for the opportunity to be part of this early
engagement.

236. See Gray & Citron, supra note 18.
237. Id. at 8, 8 n.45. We are inspired to use this formulation by Susan Freiwald. See
Susan Freiwald, The Four Factor Test (Jan. 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1012&context=susan_freiwald.
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